About the author
Just in case someone cares, my name is Henry –well, it really isn’t, but to me it feels like the name I should have been given. Not that I hold magical views on names or anything of the sort; it is just that my real name is not me enough, if that makes sense.
This, if you are wondering, is how I look:
I study philosophy and, in particular, I’m interested in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. In the former I am, broadly speaking, a physicalist, that means that I don’t consider the mind nor any of its properties to be non-physical, but the product of a particular arrangement of matter: the non-thinking stuff we are used to and unfairly tend think so lowly about.
About the philosophy of action, I’m interested mostly in the problem of free-will and its relation to our notion of moral responsibility. Here, you could say I belong to a still small minority, because I’m a hard incompatibilist. What I mean by that is that I am skeptical about the existence of free-will, and I am skeptical about it because I don’t think that free-will is possible in neither a determinist universe or in an indeterminist one. In other words, I could be referred to as “no free-will either way incompatibilist”. As a hard incompatibilist, I also deny the existence of ultimate moral responsibility, which is entailed by the denial of the existence of free-will. And on the contrary of what you might think, I don’t think any of this is a bad thing: I believe strongly that a universe without ultimate freedom and ultimate responsibility is a world that one can live meaningfully in, be happy in, love in, and be more compassionate in.